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Professor Schwarcz examines whether the bankruptcy “safe
harbor” for derivatives is necessary or even appropriate to protect
against systemic risk—such protection being the safe harbor’s
articulated justification. The article examines the most important
function of the safe harbor: allowing derivatives counterparties to
exercise their contractual enforcement remedies against a debtor
or its property notwithstanding bankruptcy law’s stay of
enforcement actions. A threshold question is whether there is anything inherently risky
about derivatives that might cause a systemic failure.
The standard answer is volatility. But, the article observes, regulation could reduce that
potential for systemic risk in a more limited fashion. The article next addresses the safe
harbor from the standpoint of its impact on avoiding contagion. The safe harbor is
supposed to enable large derivatives dealers to enforce their remedies against a failed
counterparty, thereby minimizing the dealer’s losses and reducing its chance of collapse.
← Update on Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance in
Bankruptcy
Chapter 22 Roundtable in the WSJ Bankruptcy Beat →  
Categories
Select Category
Roundtable Tags
Adam J. Levitin Article III
Bankruptcy Cost Bankruptcy Theory
Benjamin Iverson Bjorn Laukemann
Chapter 14 Chapter 22
Home About Us Join Us
Join our mailing list
* indicates required
Email Address
*
First Name
Last Name
Derivatives and Collateral: Balancing Remedies and Systemic Risk | Harvard Law School Bankruptcy Roundtable
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/bankruptcyroundtable/2014/11/04/derivatives-and-collateral-balancing-remedies-and-systemic-risk/[12/11/2015 2:08:08 PM]
Protected by Akismet • Blog with WordPress
There are, however, several flaws in the safe harbor’s design to accomplish that. First, the
safe harbor incentivizes systemically risky market concentration by enabling dealers and
other parties to virtually ignore counterparty risk. Second, the safe harbor operates
independently of the size of the counterparty or its portfolio. The article then examines
how the Lehman bankruptcy might inform the safe harbor debate. The article offers a
final caution: To the extent the safe harbor might amplify, rather than protect against,
systemic risk, its negative impact would transcend the traditional derivatives market.
The full version of this article is forthcoming from the University of Illinois Law Review
and is available in draft form here.
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